This article investigates the nature of party behaviour in the legislative arena in a developing democracy by undertaking a spatial analysis of voting in the Korean National Assembly. We discover the main dimensions of politics in the Korean parliament and look at how KNA members' ideological preferences, regional interests and the shift from divided to unified government shapes relations between parties in this chamber. We find that party behaviour in the KNA is primarily ideologically based around a 'progressive-conservative' dimension of South Korean politics. However, we find that the geopolitical element of the progressive-conservative divide in Korean politics is more salient in the KNA than the socio-economic (left-right) element. We also find more division between the parties in the 17th KNA than in the 16th KNA, but this had less to do with ideological splits than the fact that the main progressive party (Uri) held the presidency and a majority in the parliament for the first time.
Introduction
On which policy issues do parties compete or coalesce in democracies? This is a relatively established research question in political science. Yet, it has mainly been answered by looking at how parties behave in the electoral and governmental arenas, for example by looking at party positions in election manifestos or the process of government formation (e.g. Budge and Keman, 1990; Budge et al., 2001) . Until recently, less attention has been paid to how parties behave in the parliamentary arena.
Nevertheless, the analysis of party behaviour in parliaments is rapidly catching up. There has been an explosion of research on voting in parliaments in the last decade as a result of the availability of parliamentary voting data (particularly on the Internet), the development of computer power and the invention of new geometric scaling techniques. This new research has mainly focused on established democratic parliaments, in North America and Western Europe, and some legislatures in developing democracies in Latin America (e.g. Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000; Hix et al., 2007; Lanfranchi and Lüthi, 1999; Londregan, 2000; Morgenstern, 2004) . There has been very little research on voting in parliaments in emerging democracies in other parts of the world.
What we do in this article is contribute to this new body of research by looking at voting in the Korean National Assembly (KNA). Electronic votes were first introduced in the KNA in March 1999, and this article is the first to look at all recorded votes since then. 1 The KNA is an interesting arena for looking at party behaviour because there are several competing views of what drives South Korean politics. Many commentators argue that an ideological 'progressive-conservative' dimension dominates the Korean party system, but there is disagreement about whether this conflict relates primarily to economic issues (such as intervention in the market), social issues (such as gender equality) or to geopolitical issues (such as policy towards North Korea). Also, research on voting patterns in South Korean elections suggests that regional conflicts are more significant than ideological issues in the electoral arena.
The KNA is also an interesting institutional context. South Korea is a presidential system, but both the president and the assembly have rights to initiate legislation. In the period we study, there was a shift from divided government, where different parties controlled the presidency and the assembly, to unified government, where the same party controlled both branches. We hence investigate whether party behaviour in the KNA is driven by the changing institutional interests of the main parties.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section we provide some background on South Korean party politics. We then discuss how the institutional design of legislative decision-making shapes party behaviour in parliaments. From these analyses we derive two hypotheses about what we expect to observe in the KNA. We then test these hypotheses by looking at roll-call voting in the KNA between 2000 and 2005. We first apply a standard geometric scaling technique (NOMINATE) and then use a regression analysis to look at the exogenous determinants of voting behaviour in the KNA.
South Korea Party Politics: Ideological and Regional Dimensions
Although presidential and KNA elections have been held since 1948, South Korea is not generally considered to have been fully democratic until 1987 (e.g. Diamond and Shin, 2000) . South Korea is a presidential system, and the president and the unicameral KNA (Gukhoe) are elected separately, in non-concurrent elections. The president has a five-year term and the KNA has a fixed four-year term.
Most public commentary on South Korean politics assumes a progressiveconservative ideological division in the party system (e.g. Hahm, 2005; Lee, 2005) . The 'progressive' tradition is mainly associated with President Kim Dae-Jung and his Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). However, the largest party in this tradition is now the Uri Party (UP), which broke away from the MDP. The UP is generally regarded as to the left of and more populist than the MDP. The dominant 'conservative' party is the Grand National Party (GNP), although there are several other conservative parties that win seats in the KNA, such as the United Liberal Democrats (ULD). There is also a 'socialist' tradition further to the left of the progressive parties, which is mainly represented in the 17th KNA by the Democratic Labour Party (DLP). Table 1 shows the party-political make-up of the 16th and 17th KNAs. The conservative parties held a majority in the 16th KNA. However, the conservatives could not dominate Korean politics in this period because the progressives controlled the presidency. Until 2003, the presidency was held by Kim Dae-Jung from the MDP. Then, in the December 2002 presidential election, the MDP candidate, Roh Moo-Hyun, narrowly defeated the GNP candidate, Lee Hoi-Chang. There were also some dramatic party realignments in the 16th KNA. Most notably, frustrated with the MDP and eager to create a legacy independently of Kim Dae-Jung, President Roh established the UP, with initially 47 of the then 115 MDP members. A few of the remaining MDP members joined the GNP and almost half of the members of the other main conservative party, the ULD, joined the GNP. The GNP then held 53 percent of the seats in the KNA, with most of the remaining members divided between the two progressive parties, the old MDP and the new UP.
The 16th KNA was also marred by bitter battles between the GNP in the KNA and President Roh. The GNP was vehemently opposed to Roh's policies towards North Korea and his ambitious public spending plans. The GNP also accused Roh's administration of incompetence and illegally interfering in the election campaign for the April 2004 KNA elections (the Korean constitution forbids the president from campaigning in KNA elections). On 12 March 2004, the KNA voted by 193 to 2 to impeach President Roh, and he stepped aside. Roh's UP members had blocked the speaker's podium for several days to prevent a vote. However, the UP members eventually decided to abstain in the vote because they realized that the impeachment crisis was beginning to play into their hands, as public support for Roh rose sharply during the showdown. The UP then swept the 17th KNA elections in April 2004, winning 152 (51 percent) of the 299 seats, and the Korean Constitutional Court overturned the impeachment decision in May 2004. Roh returned to power, and this time he controlled a majority in the 17th KNA. This progressive-conservative dimension is not exactly the same as the classic 'left-right' dimension in most Western party systems. Scholars of South Korean politics disagree about the precise substantive meaning of this dimension, and how the content of the dimension has changed since the 1987 democratization (cf. Kang, 2004; Shin and Jhee, 2005) . There is an economic aspect of the dimension, which mainly relates to corporate governance and the rights of workers. Nevertheless, these days the dimension also encapsulates security questions surrounding policies towards North Korea and the United States (a 'dove-hawk' division) as well as attitudes towards social questions, such as rights of women and minorities in Korean society. Today, the progressive end of the spectrum is usually associated with more workers' rights, a more dovish ('sunshine') policy towards North Korea and liberal social policies. On the other side, the conservative end of the spectrum is usually associated with protection of the Chaebol (the industrial conglomerates), more hawkish policies towards North Korea and traditional social policies.
However, existing research on South Korean elections suggests that party behaviour in the electoral arena is driven by regional interests. The regional concentration of the votes of the main parties is striking. In the 16th KNA elections in 2000, the MDP won 67 percent of the votes and 25 of the 29 singlemember-district seats in the south-western region of Honam (comprising the districts of North and South Jeolla and Guangju), while the GNP won 56 percent of the votes and 64 of the 65 single-member-district seats in the southeastern region of Yeongnam (comprising the districts of North and South Gyeongsang, Busan, Daegu and Ulsan) (Kim, 2000) . Then, in the 17th KNA elections in 2004, the MDP and UP together won 86 percent of the votes and 30 of the 31 single-member-district seats in Honam, while the GNP won 52 percent of the votes and 65 of the 73 single-member-district seats in Yeongnam.
There are several interpretations of this regional concentration of party support. Since South Korea is ethnically and linguistically homogeneous, the different voting patterns in Honam and Yeongnam cannot be explained by different cultural or ethno-linguistic interests. Instead, most scholars emphasize the socio-economic and ideological foundations of the division between the two regions (e.g. Cho, 2000; Choi, 1998) . The economic policies of President Park's military regime overwhelmingly favoured his native region, Yeongnam, at the expense of economic and social groups in Honam. As a result of this regional favouritism, the reformist opposition, led by Kim DaeJung, emerged in Honam. A decisive moment was the violent suppression by Chun Doo-Hwan's regime of a popular rebellion in May 1980 in Guangju, the capital of the Honam province, which resulted in the deaths of more than 200 protestors. This solidified the sense of regional identity in Honam, as the heartland of progressive forces in Korea against the conservative forces from Yeongnam. Lee (1997) Moon (2005), meanwhile, proposes an explanation which combines regional economic interests and voters' ideological preferences. In Moon's model, a voter's utility from supporting a party has two components: (1) the voter's ideological position relative to the party; and (2) the likely regional benefits per capita of the party winning (Moon, 2005: 585) . He then assumes that MDP (or UP) provides more economic benefits to Honam, while GNP provides more economic benefits to Yeongnam. As a result, in Honam, progressive and moderate voters have an incentive to support MDP (or UP), whereas conservative voters calculate the expected trade-off between the ideological losses and economic benefits of supporting MDP compared to the ideological benefits and economic losses of supporting GNP. The reverse is true in Yeongnam, where conservative and moderate voters have an incentive to support GNP, while progressive voters face a more finely balanced trade-off between the ideological and economic costs/ benefits of voting for GNP relative to MDP. Moon then presents empirical evidence that supports this argument from the electoral survey of the 16th KNA elections.
In sum, existing conceptions of South Korean politics suggest two main political dimensions that might influence party behaviour in the KNA: (1) an ideological progressive-conservative dimension, which is an amalgam of separate underlying security, economic and social dimensions; and (2) a regional dimension, which is based mainly around the economic interests of the Honam and Yeongnam regions. It might be difficult to identify ideological and regional dimensions independently, since most MDP and UP members are elected in Honam, while most GNP members are elected in Yeongnam. Nevertheless, the MDP and UP members elected outside Honam and the GNP members elected outside Yeongnam may find themselves torn between these two dimensions. As a result, if these members occasionally vote against the regional-based majorities in their parties, it should be possible to identify regional conflicts in the KNA voting records independently of ideological conflicts.
Institutional Determinants of Party Behaviour in Parliaments
The institutional design of government shapes how party behaviour in elections translates into party behaviour in the legislative arena. Some conflicts may not be observed in voting in parliaments. This could be because issues relating to these conflicts are 'screened out' by the actions of actors who control the legislative agenda. It could also be because party leaders decide not to compete on these issues as they are internally divisive, and so agree to collude rather than take opposing sides on an issue. In addition, other issues that are absent from electoral contestation might drive contestation between parties in the legislative arena. For example, parties might be internally divided on an issue and so do not discuss it in the electoral arena, but then are forced to take sides on the issue in the legislative arena.
The main determinant of which issues are dominant in the legislative arena is who controls the legislative agenda. In parliamentary systems, the cabinet normally has a monopoly on legislative initiative. This enables the parties in government to prevent an issue from coming to the floor if the government expects that the median voter in the parliament would choose a policy further from the government's preferences than the existing (status quo) policy (esp. Cox and McCubbins, 2005) . Parties in government in parliamentary systems also control the dissolution of the government and the parliament. This allows a party in government to use the threat of a voteof-confidence motion to enforce party discipline (Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Huber, 1996) . On the other side, the possibility of defeating the government and triggering new elections provides a strong incentive for opposition parties in parliamentary systems to vote against the government even if these parties prefer a government bill to the existing status quo policy. As a result, the main dimension of legislative conflict in many parliamentary systems is the institutionally driven government-opposition split rather than the left-right ideological dimension (e.g. Noury and Mielcova, 2005; Spirling and McLean, 2007) .
In many presidential systems, both the legislature and the executive have the right to initiate legislation, as is the case in South Korea (Shugart and Carey, 1992) . When there is 'unified government', when the same party or coalition of parties controls the president and a majority in the legislature, policy-making in a presidential system is similar to policy-making in a parliamentary system (esp. Cheibub, 2006) . The majority coalition can control the legislative agenda, and so restrict votes in the legislature to issues on which they can secure policies closer to their preferences than existing policies. Unified government also produces strong strategic incentives independent of these policy incentives. While the governing coalition has an incentive to try to enforce party cohesion to support governing coalition bills, opposition parties have an incentive to try to defeat the government to gain advantage in the next parliamentary or presidential elections.
The incentive structure is different when there is 'divided government', when different parties or coalitions control the president and the legislature. If both the president and the legislature have the right to initiative legislation, a majority coalition does not have the power to restrict the legislative agenda, as both sides are free to propose bills on the issues they care about.
As a result, under divided government, a wider variety of issues is likely to be present on the legislative agenda and voting is less likely to be driven by a dominant government-opposition conflict.
In general, parties are likely to be less cohesive in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems, because neither the party holding the presidency nor the majority coalition in the legislature has the power to dissolve the parliament or remove the president, and so cannot use a vote-of-confidence threat to ensure party discipline. Nevertheless, even in presidential systems there are internal incentives for legislative parties to form and discipline their members. Parliamentarians could cooperate spontaneously, but this would mean that coalitions would have to be negotiated vote by vote. As a result, politicians who expect to have similar preferences on a range of issues can reduce the transaction costs of coalition-building by agreeing a divisionof-labour, where 'leaders' decide the main policy positions and issue voting instructions, while 'backbenchers' provide labour, such as working out the position of the party on specific issues (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Rohde, 1991) .
In other words, policy issues that cut across parties are more likely to be observed in legislative voting in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems. However, even in presidential systems, the incentive structure for party leaders and backbenchers should ensure that the main policy dimensions are likely to be those that separate parties from each other rather than those that split them internally. Moreover, the dominance of inter-party splits over intra-party splits should be greater when one coalition controls the legislative agenda. So, in presidential systems where legislative initiative is shared between the legislature and the executive (as in South Korea), government-opposition splits should be stronger when there is unified government than when there is divided government.
In this respect, the Korean National Assembly is an interesting chamber for looking at how the institutional design of government affects the transmission of party behaviour at the electoral level into party behaviour in the legislative arena. As discussed, previous research suggests that two main dimensions of politics exist in the electoral arena: an ideological progressiveconservative dimension, which is an inter-party conflict, in that the parties are located at different points on this dimension; and a regional dimension, which is both an inter-party conflict, between the GNP in the south-east and the MDP and UP in the south-west, as well as an intra-party conflict, for those members elected in other regions in these parties.
However, as in most other democratic parliaments, parties in the KNA try to discipline their members. Because Korea is a presidential system, the party leaders in the KNA cannot threaten their backbenchers with early elections. However, the party leaders can use other mechanisms to enforce party discipline, such as control of the selection of candidates in elections, and the promise of promotion inside the party and to significant legislative positions. In addition, party leaders have control of the legislative agenda, and also control which issues are the subject of roll-call votes, and so can restrict open voting to issues on which they are internally united. This should enable party leaders to restrict splits in the KNA to broad ideological questions rather than intra-party regional splits. This consequently leads to the following hypothesis about party behaviour in the Korean National Assembly:
Hypothesis 1: the main dimension of conflict in the KNA is likely to be the progressive-conservative division between the main political parties rather than the regional dimension.
Furthermore, because in the South Korean system both the president and the legislature can initiate legislation and the budget is proposed by the president, the ability of party leaders to control the agenda varies according to whether there is unified government or divided government. During the 16th KNA, while the president was the leader of the MDP, there was a conservative majority in the KNA, dominated by the GNP. In the 17th KNA, in contrast, the president was the leader of UP and there was a progressive majority, led by UP, in the KNA, at least for the period we are studying. 2 This consequently leads to a second hypothesis about what should drive party behaviour in the Korean National Assembly:
Hypothesis 2: because of the shift from divided to unified government, the main dimension of party behaviour in the 17th KNA is likely to be related more clearly to a government-opposition split between the main parties.
A Spatial Analysis of Voting in the KNA
To test these ideas we collected all the recorded ('roll-call') votes in the KNA since the introduction of electronic voting machines in March 1999 during the 15th KNA. The votes were entered by hand from the printed voting records. Because there were only a few votes in the 15th KNA, we analyse the votes in the entire period of the 16th KNA and the first year of the 17th KNA: so, between June 2000 and July 2005. The number of roll-call votes increased dramatically between the 16th and the 17th KNAs. Whereas there were approximately 130 roll-call votes per year in the 16th KNA, there were over 550 in the first year of the 17th KNA. However, as Table 2 shows, in both sessions of the KNA most votes were highly lopsided. In the 16th KNA, 87 percent of votes had majorities of 95 percent or greater. In the 17th KNA, the proportion of votes with this size of majority or greater declined slightly, to 77 percent, but still remained high compared to most other democratic parliaments.
We apply a standard geometric scaling technique, known as NOMINATE. 3 This method starts from the standard assumptions of spatial voting: that each legislator has an ideal point in a multidimensional policy space, and that each legislator's utility function is single-peaked and symmetric. Derived from these assumptions, the likelihood that a legislator will vote 'for' or 'against' a proposal is determined by the distance between the legislator's ideal point and the cut-point that splits the 'yes' side from the 'no' side (or the cutting-line in two dimensions). The further a legislator is from the cut-point, the more likely the legislator will vote a certain way. Building on these assumptions, NOMINATE calculates the position of each legislator as follows (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997: 233-51) . Let s denote the number of policy dimensions (k = 1, 2, . . . , s), p the number of legislators (i = 1, 2, . . . , p) and q the number of roll-call votes (j = 1, 2, . . . , q). Let legislator i's ideal point be denoted by x i , which is a vector of length s. Let each roll-call vote q be represented by vectors z jy and z jn , also of length s, where y and n refer to the policy outcomes associated with 'yes' and 'no' votes. NOMINATE then assumes that legislator i has a utility function over outcome y on vote j of:
ijy ] + ε ijy where u ijy is the deterministic portion of the utility function and ε ijy is the stochastic portion, and d is the Euclidean distance between x i and z jy . The coefficient β is a constant, which acts as a signal-to-noise ratio: as β increases, the deterministic element of the function increases relative to the stochastic element, and perfect spatial voting results; and, as β decreases, voting becomes more random. The utility of outcome n on vote j is discovered simply by substituting n for y. The stochastic term ε is assumed to be distributed as the log of the inverse exponential. This allows the probability that a legislator votes 'yes' or 'no' on a particular issue to be computed using a standard logit model. The constructed likelihood function is then maximized for each individual legislator. This allows three key parameters to be obtained: the dimensions of the political space, the 'ideal point' of each legislator on each dimension in the space and the location of the cut-point (cutting line) for each vote. 4 This method was initially developed by Poole and Rosenthal to study voting in the US Congress, but since then has been applied to voting in a large number of assemblies elsewhere in the world (e.g. Hix et al., 2006; Hug and Schulz, 2007; Landi and Pelizzo, 2005; Morgenstern, 2004; Myagkov and Kiewiet, 1996; Noury and Mielcova, 2005; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003; Voeten, 2000) . Table 3 compares the dimensionality of voting in the KNA, as measured by NOMINATE, to the dimensionality of voting in several other chambers where this method has been applied. There are two things worth noting here. First, as with most other chambers, voting in the KNA is predominantly one-dimensional, with the second dimension recovered by NOMINATE explaining only a small additional percentage of vote decisions or reducing classification errors by a small amount. Nevertheless, as measured by the Aggregate Proportional Reduction of Error (APRE), the second dimension explains slightly more variance in the KNA than in most other chambers. Second, a two-dimensional model provides a clearer picture of the 17th KNA than of the 16th KNA, in that the total amount of variance explained by two dimensions was higher for the 17th KNA than for the 16th KNA.
Figures 1 and 2 present the two-dimensional NOMINATE 'maps' of the KNA members in the 16th and 17th KNAs. In these figures, each KNA member is indicated by a single point and is labelled according to his or her party affiliation. In each figure, the distance between any two KNA members indicates how often these two members voted the same way in the votes in a particular parliament. If any two members voted the same way in every vote, they would be located in exactly the same place, while if they voted on opposite sides in every vote, they would be located as far away from each other as possible, around the 'rim' of the unit circle in the figure. It is also worth pointing out that because the votes in each parliament are scaled independently, the distances in one figure cannot be compared to the distances in the other figure.
The voting maps of the KNA suggest several things. As our first hypothesis predicts, the first dimension in the 16th session appears to capture the progressive-conservative dimension, with the UP furthest to the 'left', the MDP in the 'centre', and the GNP furthest to the 'right'. The first dimension in the 17th session also appears to be based on a government-opposition divide, with the UP (in government) on the left and the GNP and DLP (in opposition) on the right. However, in this session, the second dimension US House and Senate data from Poole and Rosenthal (1997) , UN General Assembly data from Voeten (2000) , French National Assembly data from Rosenthal and Voeten (2004) and European Parliament data from Hix et al. (2006) . might also be an ideological dimension, as the most left-wing party, the DLP, is at the top of the figure. Second, the two NOMINATE maps reveal a significant shift in the structure of party behaviour between the 16th and 17th KNAs, where voting was considerably more fragmented in the 16th session but then became more clearly bipolar in the 17th session. One change between the two sessions was in the structure of the party system, as a result of the UP breaking away from the MDP. However, after the formation of UP, the three main parties (UP, GNP and MDP) were the same in the 16th and 17th KNAs. Consistent with our second hypothesis, the main institutional change between these two periods was the shift from divided government in the 16th KNA to unified government in the 17th KNA, as discussed. The shift from divided to unified government led to a clearer government-opposition split in the 17th KNA than in the 16th. The location of the DLP in the 17th KNA is particularly significant in this regard, since it is a left-wing party but is located on the 'right' on the main dimension of voting, close to the position of the GNP.
Third, the parties are not as cohesive as one might expect, as there is considerable dispersion in the location of the members of the main parties. However, it is worth reiterating that there was a high level of overall consensus in both KNAs, as revealed by the distribution of vote-splits, which by definition means that on most votes the parties were highly cohesive.
Statistical Analysis of the Determinants of Voting Behaviour in the KNA
These maps hence suggest some evidence for our two hypotheses. However, 'eyeballing' these maps does not tell us anything about which particular issues explain the location of the individual members and the parties in the KNA or what explains the apparent internal party divisions. To investigate these issues we undertake a regression analysis, using several independent variables to predict individual KNA members' locations.
Model and Variables
Our basic model of each KNA member m's voting behaviour is as follows:
The dependent variable, LOCATION, is the location of m on either the first or second dimension recovered by NOMINATE in either the 16th or 17th KNA.
Regarding the independent variables, the term IDEOLOGY is a vector of several exogenous measures of individual members' ideological views, and hence captures the relationship between individual members' underlying preferences and their voting behaviour. The data for these variables come from surveys of the members of the 16th and 17th KNAs, where each member was asked about his or her attitudes on a variety of policy issues the Korean Party Studies Association, 2002, 2005) . The survey of the 16th KNA contained questions, among other things, on external security, internal security, aid to North Korea, reforming the conglomerates, rights of small shareholders, welfare spending, protection of the environment, private high-school education, gender equality, and capital punishment. The survey of the 17th KNA included these categories and added questions on sending Korean troops to Iraq, participation of labour unions in management, dual citizenship, foreign direct investment, rights of foreign workers, and introducing markets in education provision. These questions do not capture all the potential policy issues that might arise on the KNA legislative agenda, but nonetheless include a broad range of salient issues in South Korean politics. On each question, the KNA members were asked to locate themselves on a four-point scale: strongly in favour of the provision, conditionally in favour, conditionally opposed or strongly opposed. Two-hundredand-thirty-eight out of 273 members responded to the survey of the 16th KNA (an 86 percent response rate) and 233 out of 299 to the survey of the 17th KNA (a 78 percent response rate). With missing responses to certain policy questions, we were able to analyse the responses of 221 members of the 16th KNA and 204 members of the 17th KNA.
From these survey data we created two sets of measures of KNA members' preferences. First, we undertook a principal-components factor analysis of the responses to all the questions and calculated the preferences of the KNA members in each session on the first two unrotated factors produced by the analysis. In the 16th KNA, the first factor explains 35 percent of the variance and the second factor an additional 11 percent. In the 17th KNA, the first factor explains 30 percent of the variance and the second factor an additional 8 percent. Because the questions relating to security issues and economic issues both load highly on the first factor, we refer to the KNA members' locations derived from the factor scores on this dimension as Factor 1 (security and economics). Because the questions relating to social policy issues, such as gender equality and law and order, load highly on the second factor, we refer to the KNA members' locations derived from the factor scores on this dimension as Factor 2 (social).
Second, to try to isolate the separate effects of security, economic and social issues on voting in the KNA, we used the survey responses to calculate three simple additive scales -where we coded each question directionally and then added the responses on each question. From the responses to the security policy issues (external security, internal security, aid for North Korea and sending troops to Iraq) we calculated a security dimension score for each member (Dove-hawk) . From the responses to the economic policy issues (reforming the conglomerates, rights of small shareholders, welfare spending, and participation of labour unions in management) we calculated an economic left-right score for each member (Econ left-right) . And, from the responses to the social policy issues (protection of the environment, private high-school education, gender equality, capital punishment, dual citizenship, foreign direct investment, rights of foreign workers, and introducing markets in education provision) we calculated a social left-right score for each member (Social left-right) .
We recoded the factor-based and additive dimensions so that 0 is at the 'progressive' end and 1 is at the 'conservative' end. We then re-scaled all the dimensions between 0 and 1 to make it simpler to compare the magnitudes of the relationships between these measures of KNA members' ideological preferences and their revealed spatial locations. There is of course a correlation between the two factor-score-based dimensions and the three simple additive dimensions. We consequently enter the factor-based scales and the additive scales in separate models.
The REGIONS term is a vector of two dummy variables to capture the regional dimension of voting in the KNA. The variable Region-Yeongnam is coded 1 if a KNA member was elected in a single-member district in North Gyeongsang, South Gyeongsang, Busan, Daegu or Ulsan, and 0 otherwise. The Region-Honam variable is coded 1 if a KNA member was elected either in a single-member district or in North Jeolla, South Jeolla or Guangju, and 0 otherwise. Those KNA members who were elected on the proportional party lists have the value of 0 for each variable, since the PR seats are allocated on a single national district.
The PARTY term is a vector of dummy variables for each of the main parties in the 16th and 17th KNAs. We estimate separate models with these variables excluded and with them included. When the party dummies are included, the coefficients on the other independent variables relate to average variance within each party's group of KNA members.
Finally, the CONTROLS term is a vector of two variables that control for potential individual-level characteristics that might influence how KNA members behave vis-à-vis their party leaders. The first variable, Times elected, is the number of times a member had been elected to the KNA. The second variable, Age, is the age of each KNA member in the 16th and 17th sessions.
We estimate the models using OLS regression. A table of descriptive statistics for all the variables is contained in the Appendix. Table 4 shows the results for the 16th KNA and Table 5 the results for the 17th KNA. The main findings are as follows. First, in line with our first hypothesis, the main dimension of political behaviour in the KNA is an ideological conflict between progressives and conservatives. This dimension, as measured by the first factor derived from the survey of KNA members, is highly significant in both sessions of the parliament. Also, the magnitude of the relationship between exogenous security and economic preferences and voting behaviour in the KNA is large. For example, in both sessions, a 10 percent movement along the exogenously measured ideological scale corresponds to about a 6 percent movement along the first dimension recovered by NOMINATE (from models 1 and 9).
Results
Furthermore, looking at the three additive scales from the surveys of KNA members' preferences, which allows us to isolate the security issue from the economic issue, reveals that security issues dominate politics inside the KNA. KNA members' economic preferences are significant in the 16th KNA but not in the 17th. Above all, though, in both sessions of the KNA, the relationship between KNA members' preferences on economic issues and their voting behaviour in the parliament is less than one-third of the magnitude of the relationship between the members' 'dove-hawk' preferences and their voting behaviour.
Second, the substantive meaning of the second dimension is less clear. In the 16th KNA, the two factor scales are significant in the model without the party variables (model 5), but the r 2 statistic is very small. In the 17th KNA, in contrast, the second dimension is more meaningful, and is clearly related to economic left-right preferences. The combined security and economic dimension is significant. However, when security and economic issues are separated, economic left-right preferences explain almost twice as much variance in members' voting behaviour as dove-hawk preferences. This is the case between parties as well as within parties, as the models with the party variables reveal (models 15 and 16).
Third, in contrast to the explanatory power of ideological preferences of KNA members, their regional interests are less easily identified in their voting behaviour. The Yeongnam and Honam variables are significant on the first dimension in both sessions of the KNA in the models without the party variables. However, in these models it is impossible to differentiate between a partisan and a regional effect, as the Yeongnam variable is really capturing GNP members, while the Honam variable is really capturing UP and MDP members. When the party variables are added, there is no discernible regional effect. In other words, whereas Park (2004) suggests that the GNP members from Yeongnam are more conservative than their colleagues, we find no evidence that GNP members from Yeongnam actually vote in a more conservative way than GNP members from other regions.
The only exception to this general finding is on the second dimension in the 16th KNA, where there is some evidence that members of the same party who are elected in Yeongnam (in other words the GNP members from Yeongnam) vote differently from members elected in other regions. More precisely, the members elected in Yeongnam are towards the bottom of the cluster of GNP members in Figure 1 . However, as discussed, the policy meaning of the second dimension in the 16th KNA is unclear. Hence, other factors might explain the small difference between the GNP members from The method is OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The method is OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Yeongnam and other regions in this period. For example, the GNP members from Yeongnam tend to be elected in safer seats than the GNP members in other regions.
Fourth, there is a strong partisan effect in the KNA. Adding parties raises the explanatory power of the models enormously. For example, in the models of the 16th KNA, the r 2 on the first dimension doubles when party dummies are included in the results. And, in the models of the 17th KNA, the r 2 on the first dimension almost trebles when party dummies are included. This is not true of the second dimension in the 17th KNA. On the one hand, this dimension is driven by a split between the socialist DLP and the other parties, and hence relates to party behaviour on economic issues. On the other hand, this dimension also captures splits on economic issues inside UP and GNP.
The kernel density plots in Figure 3 illustrate the effect of parties on the translation of ideological conflicts into voting in the KNA. When asked to locate themselves on a series of policy issues, there is considerable dispersion in the preferences of the UP and GNP members as well as an overlap in the preferences of the members of these two parties. However, in their voting behaviour in the KNA, the effect of party discipline means that these two groups of parliamentarians are clearly distinct. 
Conclusions
The main ideological dimensions of South Korean electoral politics are also the main dimensions of voting in the Korean National Assembly, despite the generally high level of consensus in this chamber. What is perhaps more surprising is that contestation inside the KNA is more ferocious on the security aspect of the progressive-conservative dimension, relating mainly to policies towards North Korea and the United States, than the economic policy aspect of this conflict, which is present but plays a less significant role. These 'dove-hawk' preferences structured voting in the 16th session, in a period of divided government and before the formation of the Uri Party, as well as in the 17th session, after President Roh's UP had won a majority in the assembly. In contrast, whereas there are strong regional effects in voting behaviour in Korean elections, it is difficult to identify any regional effect in voting in the KNA independently of the ideological or institutional divisions between the main parties. While the battle between GNP and UP may be related to the ideological or socio-economic interests of Yeongnam and Honam, there is little evidence of splits inside the main parties between politicians elected in these two regions and politicians elected in other regions in Korea. These regional divisions may simply not exist inside the parties. An alternative explanation, though, is that we do not observe regional splits in the parties because the leaders of GNP come from Yeongnam while the leaders of UP come from Honam, and these two sets of leaders are able to force their party members from other regions to support the regional-based interests of the two main parties. As a result, regional conflicts tend to be fought out between the main parties rather than within them.
These results are consistent with the fact that we find relatively cohesive parties in the KNA. Because South Korea is a presidential system, party leaders cannot use the threat of dissolving the chamber to enforce party discipline. The survey data also reveal that the members of the main parties have relatively heterogeneous preferences. Despite these facts, the party leaders in South Korea have a key tool to discipline their members: the power to nominate candidates in safe electoral districts, for example in Yeongnam for GNP and Honam for UP. As a result, the general policy positions, regional interests and institutional interests of the main political parties are stronger determinants of voting behaviour in the KNA than the personal ideological preferences of the individual KNA members.
Finally, the shift from divided government in the 16th KNA to unified government in the 17th sharpened the partisan structure of voting in the KNA. This shift also imposed a powerful government-opposition split on the basic ideological structure of party behaviour. When both major parties had access to the legislative agenda in the 16th KNA, party positions in the KNA were clearly determined by ideological preferences: with the UP on the left, the MDP in the centre and the GNP on the right. When the UP gained a monopoly on agenda power, by controlling the presidency and a majority in the 17th KNA, the main dimension of voting became associated with strategic interests rather than ideological preferences: with the UP voting against the GNP, MDP and DLP. As a result, some ideological divisions emerged as a second dimension of voting in the 17th KNA: between the DLP on the radical left and the other three parties.
Overall, looking at parliamentary voting inside the Korean National Assembly reveals some interesting things about the nature of party behaviour in an emerging democracy with a presidential system of government. As rollcall voting data become increasingly available from parliaments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and elsewhere, we should be able to investigate in more detail how voters' preferences and electoral divisions between parties are translated into politics and policy-making in the legislative arena in different party systems and under different institutional designs of government. 
Notes

